Membership inference attacks seek to infer the membership of individual training instances of a privately trained model. This paper presents a membership privacy analysis and evaluation system, MPLens, with three unique contributions. First, through MPLens, we demonstrate how membership inference attack methods can be leveraged in adversarial ML. Second, we highlight with MPLens how the vulnerability of pre-trained models under membership inference attack is not uniform across all classes, particularly when the training data is skewed. We show that risk from membership inference attacks is routinely increased when models use skewed training data. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of differential privacy as a mitigation technique against membership inference attacks. We discuss the trade-offs of implementing such a mitigation strategy with respect to the model complexity, the learning task complexity, the dataset complexity and the privacy parameter settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) has seen an explosion of interest with the development of cloud platform services. Most MLaaS platforms offer two categories of services. (1) Machine learning model training. This type of service allows users to upload their datasets (often sensitive) and perform task-specific analysis including private machine learning and data analytics. The ultimate goal of this service is to construct one or more trained predictive models. (2) Hosting service for pre-trained models. This service provides pre-trained models with a prediction API. Consumers are able to select and query such APIs to obtain task specific data analytic results on their own query data.
With the exponential growth of digital data in governments, enterprises, and social media, there has also been a growing demand for privacy protections, leading to legislation such as HIPAA [1] , GDPR [2] , and the California privacy law [3] . Such legislation puts limits on the sharing and transmission of the data analyzed by these platforms and used to train predictive models. All MLaaS providers and platforms are therefore subject to the compliance of such privacy regulations.
Membership Inference. Membership inference refers to the ability of an attacker to infer the membership of training examples used during model training. We call a membership inference a black-box attack if the attacker only has the access to the prediction API of a privately trained model and therefore does not have any knowledge of either the private training process or the privately trained model.
In this paper, we investigate two key problems regarding model vulnerability to membership inference attacks. First, we are interested in understanding how skewness in training data may impact the membership inference threat. Second, we are interested in understanding a frequently asked question: can differentially private model training mitigate membership inference vulnerability? This includes several related questions, such as when such mitigation might be effective and the reasons why differential privacy may not always be the magic bullet to fully conquer all membership inference threats.
Machine learning with Differential Privacy. Differential privacy (DP) provides a formal mathematical framework bounding the impact of individual instances on the output of a function. In the context of deep learning (DL), a deep neural network model is said to be differentially private if its training function is differentially private therefore guaranteeing the privacy of its training data. Thus, conceptually, DP provides a natural mitigation strategy against membership inference threats. If training processes could limit the impact that any single individual instance may have on the model output, then the DP theory [4] would guarantee that an attacker would be incapable of identifying with high confidence that an individual example is included in the training dataset. Additionally, recent research has indicated that DP also has a connection to the model robustness against adversarial examples [5] .
Unfortunately, DP can be challenging to implement efficiently in deep neural network training for a number of reasons. First, it introduces a substantial number of parameters into the machine learning (ML) process, which already has an overwhelming number of hyper-parameters for performance tuning. Second, existing differentially private DL methods tend to have a high cost in prolonged training time and lower training and testing accuracy. The effort for improving DL with DP has therefore been centered on improving training efficiency and maintaining high training accuracy [6] , [7] . We argue that balancing privacy, security, and utility remains an open challenge for supporting DP in the context of ML in general, and deep neural network model training in particular.
Contributions of the paper. We present a privacy analysis and compliance evaluation system, MPLens, which investigates Membership Privacy through a multi-dimensional Lens. MPLens aims to expose membership inference vulnerabilities, including those unique to varying distributions of the training data. We also leverage MPLens to investigate DP as a mitigation technique for membership inference risk in the context of deep neural network model training. Our privacy analysis system can serve for both MLaaS providers and data scientists to conduct privacy analysis and privacy compliance evaluation. This paper presents our initial design and implementation of MPLens and it makes three original contributions.
First, through MPLens, we demonstrate how membership inference attack methodologies can be leveraged in adversarial ML. Datasets developed by using the model prediction API for MLaaS not only reveal private information about the training dataset, such as the underlying distributions of the private training data, but they can also be used in developing and validating the adverse utility of adversarial examples.
Second, MPLens identifies and highlights that the vulnerability of pre-trained models to the membership inference attack is not uniform when the training data itself is skewed. We show that risk from membership inference attacks is routinely increased when models use skewed training data. This vulnerability variation becomes particularly acute in federated learning environments wherein participants are likely to hold information representing different subsets of the population and therefore may incur different vulnerability to attack due to their participation. We argue that an in-depth understanding of such disparities in privacy risks represent an important aspect for promoting fairness and accountability in ML.
Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of DP as a mitigation technique against membership inference attacks. We discuss the trade-offs of implementing such a mitigation strategy for preventing membership inference and the impact of DP on different classes when deep neural network (DNN) models are trained using skewed training datasets.
II. MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
Membership inference attacks seek to identify whether or not an individual is a member of the dataset used to train a particular target ML model. We discuss the definition and generation of membership inference attacks which will serve as the basic reference model of membership inference.
A. Attack Definition
In studying membership inference attacks there are two primary sets of processes at play: (1) the training, deployment, and use of the ML model which the attacker is targeting for inference and (2) the development and use of the membership inference attack. Each of these two elements has guiding predefined objectives impacting respective outputs.
1) Machine Learning Model Training and Prediction:
Training of and prediction using the ML model which the attacker is targeting may be formalized as follows. Consider a dataset D comprised of n training instances (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n ) with each instance x i containing m features, denoted by x i = (x i,1 , . . . , x i,m ), and a class value y i ∈ Z k , where k is a finite integer ≥ 2. Let F t : R m → R k be the target model trained using this dataset D. F t is then deployed as a service such that users can provide a feature vector x ∈ R m , and the service will then output a probability vector p ∈ R k of the form p = (p 1 , . . . , p k ), where p i ∈ [0, 1]∀i, and k i=1 p i = 1. The prediction class label y according to F t for a feature vector x is the class with highest probability value in p. Therefore y = arg max i∈Zk F t (x).
2) Membership Inference Definition:
The most limited access environment in which an attacker may conduct the membership inference attack is the black-box access environment wherein the attacker may only query the target model F t through some MLaaS API and receive only the corresponding prediction vectors.
Consider an attacker with such black-box access to F t . Many different datasets and model types have demonstrated vulnerability to membership inference attacks in black-box settings. Table I reports 5 accuracy results for black-box attackers targeting decision tree models for problems ranging from binary classification (Adult) to 100-class classification (Purchases-100). We note that all experiments evaluated the attack model against an equal number of instances in the target training dataset D as those not in D. The baseline membership inference accuracy is therefore 50%. We refer readers to [8] for more details on these datasets and experimental set up.
These results demonstrate both the viability of membership inference attacks as well as the variation in vulnerability between datasets. This accentuates the need for practitioners to evaluate their system's specific vulnerability.
Recently, researchers showed similar membership inference vulnerability in settings where attackers have white-box access to the target model, including the output from the intermediate layers of a pre-trained neural network model or the gradients for the target instance [9] . Interestingly, this study showed that the intermediate layer outputs, in most cases, do not lead to significant improvements in attack accuracy. This result further supports the understanding that the attackers can gain sufficient knowledge from only the black-box access to the pre-trained models which is common in MLaaS platforms.
B. Attack Generation
The attack generation process can vary significantly based on the power of the attacker. For example, the attack proposed in [10] requires knowledge of the training error of F t . The attack technique proposed in [11] , however, requires computational power and involves the training of multiple ML models. The techniques proposed in [12] are different still in that they require the attacker to develop effective threshold values. Figure 1 gives a workflow sketch of membership inference attack generation algorithm. We use the shadow model technique documented in [11] and [8] to describe the attack generation process of membership inference attacks, while noting that many of the processes may be applicable to other attack generation techniques.
1) Generating Shadow Data and Substitute Models: In the shadow model technique, an attacker must first generate or access a shadow dataset, a synthetic labeled dataset D to mirror the data in D. Authors in [11] and [8] both outline potential approaches to generating such a synthetic dataset from scratch while in some cases, such as with competitors to the owner of the target model, attackers may also have examples of their own which can be used as shadow data.
Shadow models are then trained on a subset of the shadow dataset D . As the attacker knows which portion of D was provided to each shadow model, the attacker can observe behavior in response to instances which were in a training set versus behavior in response to those that were held out.
2) Generating Attack Datasets and Models: Attackers use the observations of the shadow models to develop an attack dataset D * which captures the difference between the output generated by the shadow models for instances included in the training data and those previously unseen by models. D * is used to generate a binary classifier F a which provides predictions on whether an instance was previously known to a model based on the model's output from that instance. At attack time this binary classifier may the be deployed against the target model service in a black-box setting taking prediction vectors as input and providing predictions as to whether or not the instance was in the training data as output.
The totality of these two phases: (1) generating shadow data and substitute models and (2) generating attack datasets and models, constitute the primary processes for constructing the membership inference attack.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE

A. Impact of Model Based Factors on Membership Inference
The most widely acknowledged factor impacting vulnerability to membership inference attacks is the degree of overfitting in the trained target model. Shokri et al. [11] demonstrate that the more over-fitted a DNN model is, the more it leaks under membership inference attacks. Yeom et al. [10] investigated the role of overfitting from both the theoretical and the experimental perspectives. While their results confirm that models become more vulnerable as they overfit more severely, the authors also state that overfitting is not the only factor leading to model vulnerability. Truex et al. [8] further demonstrate that several other model based factors also play important roles in causing model vulnerability to membership inference, such as classification problem complexity, in-class standard deviation, and the type of ML model targeted.
B. Impact of Attacker Knowledge on Membership Inference
Another category of factors that may cause model vulnerability is the type and scope of knowledge which attackers may have about the target model and its training parameters. For example, Truex et al. [8] identified the impact that attacker knowledge with respect to both the training data of the target model and the target data have on the accuracy of the membership inference attack. This was evaluated by varying the degree of noise in the shadow dataset and target data used by the attacker. Table II shows the experimental results on four datasets with four types of learning tasks. The datasets include the CIFAR-10 dataset which contains 32×32 color images of 10 different classes of objects while the Purchases datasets were developed from the Kaggle Acquire Valued Shoppers Challenge dataset and represent 10, 20, and 50 different shopping profile types based on purchase history.
The experiments in Table II demonstrate the impact of the attacker knowledge of the target data points by evaluating how adding varying degrees of to data features may impact on the success rate of membership inference attacks. Noise uniformly sampled from [0, σ], σ ≤ 1 and added to features normalized within [0, 1]. Given a level of uncertainty of x or inaccuracy in D on the part of the attacker, represented by a corresponding degree of noise σ, Table II evaluates how effective the attacker remains in launching a membership inference attack to identify if x ∈ D or x / ∈ D. The results reported in Table II are reported for four logistic regression models, each one trained on a different dataset with gradually increasing σ values (degree of noise).
For all four datasets, the more accurate (the less noise) the attacker knowledge about x is, the higher the model vulnerability (attack success rate) to membership inference. While adding noise to the shadow dataset results in a less severe drop in accuracy, similar trends are still observed. This set of experiments demonstrates that attackers with different knowledge and different levels of resources may have different success rates in launching a membership inference attack. Thus, model vulnerability should be evaluated by taking into account potential or available attacker knowledge.
C. Transferability of Membership Inference
Inspired by the transferability of adversarial examples [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , membership inference attacks are also shown to be transferable. That is, attack model F a trained on an attack dataset D * containing the outputs from a set of shadow models can still be effective when shadow models and the target model are of different types. This property further opens the door to the black-box attackers who do not have any knowledge of the target model. (1) the same strategy used for selecting the shadow model type may not be optimal for the attack model and (2) shadow models of different types other than the target model type may still lead to successful membership inference attacks. We refer readers to [8] for additional detail. The transferability study in Table III indicates an attacker does not always need to know the exact target model configuration to launch an effective membership inference attack as attack models can be transferable from one target model type to another. And although finding the most effective attack strategy can be a challenging task for attackers, vulnerability to membership inference attack remains serious even with suboptimal attack configurations with almost all configurations reporting attack accuracy about 70% and many above 85%.
D. Training Data Skewness on Membership Attacks
The fourth important dimension of membership inference vulnerability is the risk imbalance across different prediction classes when the training data is skewed. Even when the overall membership inference vulnerability appears limited with attack success close to the 50% baseline (in or out random guess), there may be subgroups within the training data, which display significantly more vulnerability.
For example, Figure 2 illustrates the impact of data skewness on membership inference vulnerability for a decision tree target model trained on the publicly available Adult dataset [17] classifying an individual's salary as > $50K or ≤ $50K. The class distribution is skewed with less than 25% of instances being labeled >$50K. Figure 2 shows that the impact of overfitting (increasing in X-axis) on both the aggregate membership inference vulnerability in terms of membership inference attack accuracy (accuracy over all classes) and the minority membership inference vulnerability (attack accuracy over the minority class).
We observe from Figure 2 that, the minority class has an increased risk under the membership inference attack as the model over-fits more severely. We argue that it is important for both data owners for model training and the MLaaS providers to consider vulnerability not just for the entire training dataset, but also the level of risk for minority populations specifically when evaluating privacy compliance.
IV. MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND ALGORITHMS
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal privacy framework with rigorous mathematical guarantees when effectively employed [4] . A ML algorithm is differentially private if and only if the inclusion of a single instance in the training dataset will cause only statistically insignificant changes to the algorithm output. Theoretical limits are set on such output changes in the definition of differential privacy, given formally as follows:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [4] ): A randomized mechanism K provides ( , δ)-differential privacy if for any two neighboring database D 1 and D 2 that differ in only a single entry, ∀S ⊆ Range(K),
If δ = 0, K is said to satisfy -differential privacy.
In the remaining of the paper, we focus on -differential privacy for presentation convenience. To achieve -DP, noise defined by is added to the algorithm's output. This noise is proportional to the sensitivity of the output. Sensitivity measures the maximum change of the output due to the inclusion of a single data instance.
The noise mechanism used is therefore bounded by the sensitivity of the function f , S f , and privacy parameter . For example, consider the Gaussian mechanism defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Gaussian Noise Mechanism):
where N (0, S 2 f σ 2 ) is the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation S f σ. A single application of the Gaussian mechanism in Definition 2 to a function f with sensitivity S f satisfies ( , δ)-DP if δ ≥ 5 4 exp(−(σ ) 2 /2) and < 1 [18] . Additionally, the DP framework provides for ML processes which often require multiple passes over the data through the Sequential Composition property as follows:
Definition 3 (Sequential Composition [18] , [19] ): Let f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n be n algorithms, such that for each i ∈ [1, n], f i satisfies i -DP. Then, releasing the outputs
DP can be employed to different types of ML models. Due to the space constraint, we specifically focus on differentially private training of deep neural network (DNN) models.
B. Mechanisms for Differentially Private Deep Learning
DNNs are complex, sequentially stacked networks containing multiple layers of interconnected nodes. Each node represents the dataset in a unique way and each layer of networked nodes processes the input from previous layers using learned weights and a pre-defined activation function. The objective in training a DNN is to find the optimal weight values for each node in the multi-tier networks. This is accomplished by making multiple passes over the entire dataset with each pass constituting one epoch. Within each epoch, the entire dataset is partitioned into many mini-batches of equal size and the algorithm processes these batches sequentially, each including only a subset of the data. When processing one batch, the data is fed forward through the network using the existing weight values. A pre-defined loss function is computed for the errors made by the neural network learner with respect to the current batch of data. An optimizer, such as stochastic gradient descent (SGD), is then used to propagate these errors backward through the network. The weights are then updated according to the errors and the learning rate set by the training algorithm. The higher the learning rate value, the larger the update made in response to the backward propagation of errors.
Differentially private DL can be implemented by adding a small amount of noise to the updates made to the network. The noise added to the updates is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with scale determined by an appropriate noise parameter σ corresponding to a desired level of privacy and controlled sensitivity according to Definition 1. Let n denote the number of epochs for the DNN training, a predefined hyper-parameter set at the training configuration as the termination condition. Let one epoch satisfy i -DP given σ i from the Gaussian mechanism in Definition 2. Then, a traditional accounting using the composition properties of DP (Definition 3) would dictate that n epochs would result in an overall privacy guarantee of if i = /n, and each epoch employed the Gaussian mechanism with the same value σ i . We refer to this approach the fixed noise perturbation method [6] . An alternative approach proposed by Yu et. al. in [7] advocates a variable noise perturbation approach, which uses a decaying function to manage the total privacy budget and define variable noise scale σ based on different settings of i for each different epoch i in a decreasing manner as the training progresses in epochs. Thus, we have i = j for i = j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and σ i for a given epoch i is bounded by its allocated privacy budget i . The same overall privacy guarantee is met when
for the differentially private DNN training of n epochs.
C. Differentially Private Deep Learning with Fixed σ
A summary of the approach in [6] is given in Algorithm 1. To apply differential privacy, the sensitivity of each epoch is bounded by a clipping value C, specifying that an instance may impact weight updates by at most C. Weight updates at the end of each batch then include noise injection according to the sensitivity defined by C and the scale of noise σ. The choice of σ is directly related to the overall privacy guarantee. 
Output θ T and compute the overall privacy cost ( , δ) using a privacy accounting method.
Let σ = √ 2 log(1/δ) , then according to DP theory [18] , each step (processing of a batch) is ( , δ)-differentially private. If L t is randomly sampled from D then additional properties of random sampling [20] , [21] may be applied. Each step then becomes (O(q ), qδ)-differentially private. The moments accountant privacy accounting method is also introduced in [6] to prove that Algorithm 1 is (O(q √ T ), δ)-differentially private given appropriate parameter settings.
We refer to Algorithm 1 as the fixed noise perturbation approach as each epoch is treated equally by introducing the same noise scale to every parameter update.
D. Differentially Private Deep Learning with Variable σ
The variable noise perturbation approach to differentially private DL is proposed by Yu et al. [7] . The authors analyze the problem of using fixed noise scale (fixed σ values) and propose employing different noise scales to the weight updates at different stages of the training process. Specifically, Yu et al. [7] propose a set of methods for privacy budget allocation, which improve model accuracy by progressively reducing the noise scale as the training progresses. The variable σ noise scale approach is inspired by two observations. First, as the training progresses, the model begins to converge causing the noise being introduced to the updates to potentially become more impactful. This slows down the rate of model convergence and causes later epochs to no longer increase model accuracy compared to non-private scenarios. Second, the research on improving training accuracy and convergence rate of DNN training has led to a new generation of learning rate functions that replace the constant learning rate baseline by decaying learning rate functions and cyclic learning rates [22] , [23] . Yu et al. [7] employed a similar set of decay functions to add noise at a decreased scale.
E. Important Implementation Factors 1) Choosing Epsilon:
In differentially private algorithms, choosing the correct value requires a careful balance between tolerable privacy leakage given the practical setting as well as the tolerable utility loss and has seen research results suggesting various approaches [24] - [27] .
Despite some existing approaches, determining the "right" value remains a complex problem and is likely to be highly dependent on the privacy policy of the organization that owns the model and the dataset, the vulnerability of the model, the sensitivity of the data, and the tolerance to utility loss in the given setting. Additionally, there might be scenarios, such as the healthcare setting, in which even small degrees of utility loss are intolerable and are combined with stringent privacy constraints given highly sensitive data. In these cases, it may be hard or even impossible to find a good value for existing differentially private DNN training techniques.
2) The Role of Transfer learning: Another key consideration is the use of transfer learning for dealing with more complex datasets [6] , [7] . For example, model parameters may be initialized by training on a non-private, similar dataset. The private dataset is then only used to further hone a subset of the model parameters. This helps to reduce the number of parameters affected by the noise addition required by exercising DP. The use of transfer learning however relies on a strong, potentially unrealistic, assumption that such a nonprivate, similar dataset exists and and is available.
3) Parameter Optimization: In additional to the privacy budget parameter , differentially private DL introduces influential privacy parameters, such as the clipping value C and the noise scale approach (including potential decay parameters) for σ. Privacy parameter settings may impact both the training convergence rate, and thus the training time, and the training and testing accuracy. For DL with DP, one needs to configure the privacy parameters by considering the side effect on other hyper-parameters and re-configure the previously tuned learning hyper-parameters to account for the privacy approach.
For example, for a fixed total privacy budget , too small of a number of epochs may result in reduced accuracy due to insufficient learning. A higher number of epochs however will require in a higher σ value at each epoch (recall Algorithm 1). Therefore, a carefully tuned hyper-parameter for a non-private setting, such as the optimal number of epochs, may no longer be effective when differentially private DL is enabled.
A number of challenging questions remain open problems in differentially private DNN training, such as at what point do more epochs lead to accuracy loss under a particular privacy setting? What is the right noise decaying function for effective DL with differential privacy? Can we learn privately with high accuracy given complex datasets? The balance of the many parameters in a differentially private DL system presents new challenges to practitioners.
With these questions in mind, we develop MPLens to facilitate the evaluation of model vulnerability against membership inference attacks. Through MPLens, we investigate the effectiveness of DP as a mitigation technique against membership inference attacks, including the trade-offs of implementing such a mitigation strategy for preventing membership inference and the impact of DP on different classes for the DNN models trained using skewed training datasets. We also highlight how the vulnerability of pre-trained models under the membership inference attack is not uniform when the training data itself is skewed with minority populations. We show how this vulnerability variation may cause increased risks in federated learning systems.
V. MPLENS: SYSTEM OVERVIEW
MPLens is designed as a privacy analysis and privacy compliance evaluation system for both data scientists and MLaaS providers to understand the membership inference vulnerability risk involved in their model training and model prediction process. Figure 3 provides an overview of the system architecture. The system allows providers to specify a set of factors that are critical to privacy analysis. Example factors include the data used to train their model, what data might be held by the attacker, what attack technique might be used, the degree of data skewness in the training set, whether the prediction model is constructed using the differentially private model training, what configurations are used for the set of DP parameters, and so forth. Given the model input, the MPLens evaluation system reports the overall statistics on the vulnerability of the model, the per-class vulnerability, as well as the vulnerability of any sensitive populations such as specific minority groups. Example statistics include attack accuracy, precision, recall, and f-1 score. We also include attacker confidence for true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives, the average distance from both the false positives and the false negatives to the training data, and the time required to execute the attack. Due to space limitations, we refer readers to [28] for further detail. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Datasets
Experiments reported in this section were conducted using the following four datasets: (1) CIFAR-10 [29] containing 10 classes with 6,000 images each, (2) CIFAR-100 containing 100 classes with 600 images each, (3) MNIST [30] with 10 classes representing digits between 0 and 9, and (4) The Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) database contains face photographs for unconstrained face recognition with more than 13,000 images of faces labeled with a gender and race (including mixed races). Data is then selected for the top 22 classes which were represented with a sufficient number of data points.
B. Membership Inference Risk: Adversarial Examples
Figures 4-6 provide visualization plots for the comparison of 2-D PCA given the images of the dog and truck classes in CIFAR-10. These plots illustrate how even with the inclusion of false positives, an attacker can create a good representation of the training data distribution, particularly compared to those instances not predicted to be in the target training data. An attacker can therefore easily train a substitute model on this representative dataset which then enables the generation of adversarial examples by attacking this substitute model [31] . Examples developed to successfully attack a substitute model trained on the instances in Figure 4 are likely to also be successful against a model trained on the instances in Figure 4 .
C. Membership Inference Risk: Data Skewness
In this section, we focus on studying the impact of data skewness on vulnerability to membership inference attacks. In Figure 7 we investigate the impact of data skewness on membership inference vulnerability by controlling the representation of one class. We reduce the automobile images in the CIFAR-10 dataset to only 1% of the data and then increase representation until the dataset is balanced with automobile as 10% of the training images. We then plot the aggregate membership inference vulnerability (the overall membership inference attack accuracy evaluated across all classes) as well as the vulnerability of just the automobile class. Figure 7 demonstrates that in cases where the automobile class constitutes 5% or less of the total training dataset, i.e. the automobile class has fewer than half as many instances as each of the other classes, this skewness will result in the automobile class displaying more severe vulnerability to membership inference attack. This gap becomes greater as continued decreased representation results in continued increased vulnerability for the automobile class. Table IV additionally shows the vulnerability of a DNN target model trained on the LFW dataset to membership inference attacks. We analyze this vulnerability by breaking down the aggregated vulnerability across the top 22 classes into four different subsets of the LFW dataset: Male, Female, White Race, and Racial Minority. We observe that the training examples of racial minorities experience the highest attack success rate (89.90%) and are thus highly vulnerable to membership inference attacks compared to images of white individuals. Similarly, female images, which represent less than 25% of the training data, demonstrate higher average vulnerability (76.85%) compared with images of males (68.18%).
To provide a more intuitive illustration for the increased vulnerability of minority groups under membership inference attacks, Table V provides 7 individual examples of images in the LFW dataset targeted by the membership inference attack.
Through Table V , we highlight how minority populations are more likely to be identified by an attacker with a higher degree of confidence. We next discuss each example from left to right to articulate the impact of data skewness on model vulnerability to the membership inference attack.
For the 1st image, the target model is highly confident with its prediction and is correct. Using the membership inference attack model, the attacker the accurately predicts with high confidence that the model must have seen this example. Compare this result with that of the 5th and 7th images from the majority class (white male images). In both of these cases the target model is highly confident with its prediction is correct. In the case of the 5th image the attacker is correct in predicting that the target model had seen the image while in the case of the 7th image the attacker is incorrect. However with both these images the attacker's confidence is barely over 50%. This indicates that model accuracy and confidence are weaker indicators with respect to membership inference vulnerability for the majority class.
For the 2nd image, the target model is less confident with its prediction, although the prediction outcome is correct. The attacker succeeds in the membership inference attack because it correctly predicts that this example is not in the training set, though the attacker's confidence on this membership inference is much less certain (close to 50%) compared to that of the attack to the 1st image. We conjecture that the relatively low prediction confidence by the target model may likely contribute to the fact that the attacker is unable to obtain a high confidence for his membership inference attack.
The 3rd image is predicted by the target model correctly with a confidence of 72.56%, which is about 11.5% more confidence than that for the 2nd image. However, the attacker wrongly predicts that the example is in the training set when the ground truth shows that this example is not in the training set. Assuming the same logic as with the 1st image, i.e., the confidence and accuracy of target model prediction may indicate that the image was in the training dataset, could have caused the attacker to be misled.
For the 4th image, the target model has an incorrect prediction with the confidence of 62.30%. The attacker correctly predicts that this example is not in the training set. It is clear that a somewhat confident and yet incorrect prediction by the target model is likely to result in high attacker confidence that this minority individual has not been seen during the training.
For the 6th image, the target model produces an incorrect prediction with high confidence. The attacker is very confident that the query image is not in the training dataset, which is indeed the truth. This demonstrates rare a potential vulnerability for the majority class: When the target model has high confidence in an inaccurate prediction, an attack model is able to confidently succeed in the membership inference attack. Through this example and the above analysis, we see that the majority classes have two advantages compared to the minority classes: (1) it is less common for the target model to demonstrate this vulnerability of misclassification with high confidence; and (2) for majority classes, the accuracy and privacy are aligned rather than as competing objectives.
These images highlight the compounding downfall for minority populations. Models are more likely to overfit these populations. This leads to poor test accuracy for these populations and makes them more vulnerable to attack. As the 3rd example shows, the way to fool attackers is to have an accurate target model that can show reasonable confidence when classifying minority test images.
D. Mitigation with Differentially Private Training
The second core component of our experimental analysis is to use MPLens to investigate the effectiveness of DP employed to DL models as a countermeasure for membership inference mitigation.
To define utility loss we follow [32] and consider loss = 1 − dp−acc acc where acc represents accuracy in a non-private setting and dp − acc is the accuracy when DP is employed for the same model and data.
1) Model and Problem Complexity: In Table VI compares three different datasets (first column) and learning tasks (third column) using different model structures (second column). We measure utility loss incurred when DP is introduced, including both the training loss and test loss, as well as the vulnerability when non-private training is used. For MNIST, we follow the architecture outlined in [6] and for the CIFAR datasets we apply both the approach in [32] as well as that using transfer learning (TL) from [6] . We direct the reader to those works and [28] for details. For all settings we conducted 100 epochs of learning and set ( , δ) = (10, 10 −5 ) according to the Rényi accounting approach [33] .
The results in Table VI VI: Problem complexity vs membership inference vulnerability and differential privacy utility loss ( , δ) = (10, 10 −5 )).
The CIFAR datasets are more complex and require more complex models with a greater number of trainable parameters. These models demonstrate a higher vulnerability to membership inference attack than the MNIST dataset. Unfortunately, this complexity also increases the loss in utility when a differentially private optimizer is employed in the model training.
Compare the two models trained on the most complex dataset CIFAR-100, we observe the impact of the model complexity on the vulnerability of membership inference attack. We note the more complex model structure (over 1 million parameters) has increased membership inference vulnerability for the CIFAR-100 dataset with 89.08% attack accuracy compared with the vulnerability of 74.04% when using the less complex model with reduced dimensionality of input (with 107,108 trainable parameters). However the mode complex model also reports a greater test loss of 58.39% compared to the loss of 49.34% for the less complex model.
Our experimental results from Table VI underscore an important observation. Even with differentially private DL, the most vulnerable DNN models (and datasets) are unfortunately also those which experience the greatest utility loss.
2) Implications for Skewed Datasets: An additional challenge in the deployment of differential privacy is the impact on skewed datasets. Using the approach and model structure from [32] , we experiment with different levels of data skewness in the CIFAR-10 dataset. We conduct this set of experiments by varying the data skewness in the presence of the largest reported in [32] . In addition, we also measure and report the results for smaller with the automobile class set to 2% of its training data. Figure 8 shows the results of these two sets of experiments, measured using overall model accuracy loss and automobile F-1 score loss comparing the differentially private DL setting with the non-private setting using the same model architecture and data distribution. We report the percentage of utility loss according to these scores.
In statistical analysis of binary classification, the F-1 score measures the accuracy by considering both the precision and the recall of the test to compute the score. The F-1 score is the harmonic mean of the precision and recall. To isolate the utility loss for the automobile class we therefore report the loss in F-1 score calculated using the precision and recall of only the automobile class.
On the left sub-figure of Figure 8 , we compare the accuracy loss of the overall model with the loss in F-1 score of the automobile class. This left sub-figure shows that as the skewness decreases from 2% to 10% (X-axis), the gap between the private setting and the non-private setting becomes closer. When the data skewness is high for the automobile class, the minority group is more vulnerable, as seen in Figure 7 , but unfortunately also shows the greatest utility loss for both training and test when DP is introduced.
The right sub-figure of Figure 8 compares the overall model accuracy loss with the loss in F-1 score of the automobile class. This time we vary the privacy parameter from 10 to 1000. We observe that the minority group has much higher utility loss under the privacy setting, even when the privacy budget parameter is set to larger (and theoretically almost meaningless) values. This confirms the observation that DP as a mitigation technique presents a catch-22 as the minority class is more likely to be successfully targeted by a membership inference attack but also suffers the most under DP. Figure 8 highlights how DP as a mitigation technique leads to unfortunate outcomes for minority classes. This mirrors the challenge wherein complex datasets and complex model architectures are more vulnerable to membership inference attacks, and at the same time, are also more likely to experience significant accuracy loss with differentially private DL.
VII. CONCLUSION
Membership inference attacks seek to infer membership of individual training instances of a privately trained model through black-box access to the prediction API of a MLaaS provider. We develop MPLens to expose membership inference vulnerability and perform privacy analysis and privacy compliance evaluation. We demonstrate how membership inference attack methods can be used in the development of representative datasets which can facilitate the generation of substitute models with respect to the attack target model, therefore heightening the risk for adversarial attacks. We investigate training data skewness and its impact on membership inference vulnerability. We also evaluate differential privacy as a mitigation technique for membership inference against DL models. Our empirical results show that (1) minority groups within skewed datasets display increased risk for membership inference and (2) differential privacy presents many trade-offs as a mitigation technique to membership inference risk.
